Privacy / Attacks
verifiedGradient Leakage
Federated learning sends gradients instead of data on the assumption that a gradient reveals little. It reveals a great deal: from a single update it is often possible to reconstruct the images or text that produced it, pixel by pixel, by optimising a fake input until its gradient matches. The assumption that made the design feel safe was never established.
Reconstruction quality falls with batch size, since a summed gradient over many examples is far more ambiguous than one over a few, and it falls with the noise differential privacy adds. This is why secure aggregation and DP are not optional extras on top of federated learning — they are what makes its central claim true rather than assumed.
Minimise ‖∇W(x̂, ŷ) − ∇W‖² over a candidate input x̂ initialised at random. The problem is badly determined for large batches, since many inputs produce a similar sum, which is why the practical defence is aggregating more before releasing rather than perturbing more within.
batch-examples holds 50% of the budget; rest holds the remaining 50%.
Examples summed into one released gradient against the single example an attacker wants back, in examples. Drag the batch up to watch the reconstruction lose its target in the sum.
Reviewed by opendroid · 2026-08-18
- arXiv:1906.08935 — Deep Leakage from Gradients